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ABSTRACT 
HCI research published 10 years ago pointed out that many 
users cannot cope with the number and complexity of 
passwords, and resort to insecure workarounds as a 
consequence. We present a study which re-examined 
password policies and password practice in the workplace 
today.  
32 staff members in two organisations kept a password 
diary for 1 week, which produced a sample of 196 
passwords. The diary was followed by an interview which 
covered details of each password, in its context of use. 
We find that users are in general concerned to maintain 
security, but that existing security policies are too inflexible 
to match their capabilities, and the tasks and contexts in 
which they operate. As a result, these password policies can 
place demands on users which impact negatively on their 
productivity and, ultimately, that of the organisation. 
We conclude that, rather than focussing password policies 
on maximizing password strength and enforcing frequency 
alone, policies should be designed using HCI principles to 
help the user to set an appropriately strong password in a 
specific context of use. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite a growing number of graphical and biometric 
authentication mechanisms, passwords remain the most 
familiar and commonly-used form of user authentication in 
organisational settings. In this paper, we investigate the 
impact of passwords, and their associated security policies, 
on individual users’ productivity and experience. Password 
policies govern not only construction and lifetime of 
individual passwords, but also work with other contextual 
factors to define the numbers of passwords users are 
expected to remember and the frequency with which they 
have to use them. 
Over 10 years ago, Adams & Sasse [1] found that password 
policies that do not meet users’ work practices caused high 
levels of dissatisfaction, and led to insecure practices and 
low security motivation. 
Since then, we have seen studies of passwords using 
controlled [22] and survey methodologies [10, 23], which 
provide some understanding of the policy factors that make 
passwords easier to generate, remember, and use, in ways 
which are appropriate to the situation. So - has this 
understanding been applied in practice? Has anything 
changed? 
We investigated password use in two major organisations. 
Our study combines two forms of methods: a highly-
structured diary study to capture “what happens during the 
day”, and retrospective interviews following up on the 
context around the passwords identified in the diary. By 
focussing on the password as the object of interest, we have 
been able to “look around” instances of password use, to 
identify problems in using passwords governed by specific 
policies a specific context, and to understand how users 
cope with them. We are not simply concerned with the 
extent to which users comply with policy, but to identify 
ways in which policy impacts - positively or negatively - on 
users’ daily practice of password use. 
In this way, we are able to understand more about 
contextual issues of password use: 
1.  What specific aspects of password policy cause 
problems for users? 
2.  What coping strategies do password users adopt to 
overcome those problems? 
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise,
or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior
specific permission and/or a fee. 
CHI 2010, April 10–15, 2010, Atlanta, Georgia, USA. 
Copyright 2010 ACM  978-1-60558-929-9/10/04....$10.00. 3.  How do those coping strategies affect productivity, the 
security of the specific systems, and organisation’s risk 
management in general? 
4.  Are there unexpected password issues not covered by 
existing policy? 
Based on our results, we make three key observations: 
1.  When users cannot cope with the demands of strict 
password policies, it a) reduces their productivity, and 
b) leads them to adopt coping strategies - which usually 
reduce security. 
2.  Although passwords are usually considered in terms of 
authentication for a service or a device, today they are 
encountered in many other ways in the workplace – 
and existing password policies do not cover these. As a 
result, users adopt ad-hoc solutions, which are usually 
insecure. 
3.  Security depends on the context of use. Context - 
including virtual workstations, Single Sign-on, and 
home and mobile working - impacts not only the 
frequency of password use, but also on the risks 
associated with it. 
Organisations that continue to ignore HCI design principles 
and impose unusable password policies pay a price in the 
cost/benefit trade-off between the risk of loss versus the 
cost of complying with security [12]. Password policies 
should be as strong as needed, not more. Forcing users to 
comply with policies which meet the maximum theoretical 
risk is a huge cost, not only in monetary terms but also in 
terms of the most valuable resource any organisation has - 
the goodwill of organisation members. 
BACKGROUND 
Password policies are currently set at the organisational 
level, with them aim of preserving the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the organisation’s systems and 
data. There is a growing body of evidence that people 
cannot cope with the password policies imposed on them 
[1, 7], and that, given the choice (that is, without imposed 
restrictions) users choose the weakest password they can 
get away with [10]. 
The User Cost of Password Policies 
Factors in password policy that increase the user effort 
include: password strength, type (character restrictions); 
numbers of passwords the user has to remember; and 
frequency of changing passwords. 
Conversely, factors which can be expected to mitigate the 
load on users are: Single Sign-on (SSO); password 
synchronization - a single password covering multiple 
services; and systems designed to help users cope with 
passwords in a secure way, such as local password 
management. 
Factors which place a load on the user 
Strong passwords - in the sense of password length and 
character set size - take many orders of magnitude longer to 
crack than shorter, simpler passwords [14]. But - given the 
choice - users tend to avoid non-alphanumeric symbols [10, 
13], and passwords which contain such symbols are 
significantly harder to recall and more likely to be written 
down [23]. Allan [2] calculates a “breaking point”; there is 
a maximum effective entropy - a pessimistic calculation 
puts this at about 18bits - for all types of password; 
exceeding this is likely to cause users to write passwords 
down, so that trying to increase password entropy by 
strengthening the policy will be counter-productive. 
Another consideration is that strong passwords offer no 
protection against phishing or key-logging [10, 12]. 
Frequent change and non-re-use of passwords across sites 
are the common password policy recommendations to 
mitigate such risks, but these measures are arguably of 
marginal benefit [12].  
Being required to devise high-strength passwords, with high 
frequent changes, over many passwords which are required 
to be distinct from one another, combines into a heavy load 
for the user [14, 23]. Organisational policy generally has no 
control over numbers of additional “private” passwords 
users may have, but organisations can reduce the need for 
multiple passwords within the workplace through technical 
measures, such as Single-Sign On (SSO), or use of 
alternative authentication mechanisms, such as biometrics. 
The former has become more common over the past 10 
years, but adoption of alternatives to passwords has been 
slow. 
The Impact of Password Policies 
In this section, we examine the current guidelines on how to 
select password policies, and the user load results from 
different policies. Recent guidelines by the US National 
Institute of Standards and Technology [14] organise aspects 
of password policy around identified risks in the 
compromise of password-based authentication systems. 
Among the recommendations which impact on users, they 
cover: 
1.  Secure transmission of passwords, to mitigate 
password capture; 
2.  Construction of strong passwords, and a (high) limit on 
the frequency of guesses, to mitigate guessing and 
cracking; 
3.  Password expiration and avoidance of recently-used 
passwords, to mitigate the use of compromised 
passwords; and 
4.  Use of Single Sign-On and local password 
management, to enable stronger policies while 
reducing the load on the user. Other points which a password policy should consider 
include: 
1.  Timeouts and screen locking, to mitigate opportunistic 
mis-use of an unattended desktop; and 
2.  Rules about sharing passwords - traditional advice [9] 
suggests that this is to be avoided, but others [1] found 
situations in which password sharing might be 
appropriate in the workplace [1] or for personal 
banking [20]. 
Password Policies in the Context of Use 
Password policies need to be understood in the concrete 
reality of daily use - which Dourish et al. have called 
“security in the wild” [7]. In this real-life context, password 
use is a secondary task, and an interruption to the user’s 
primary task [4]. Moreover, password use does not occur in 
isolation, but works alongside other access control 
mechanisms and factors in the context of use. 
What Passwords Do People Actually Choose? 
Password policy sets out the constraints within which users 
must operate; users choose passwords within those limits, 
in ways which we aim to understand more. For example, do 
they conform minimally or maximally to password 
construction rules? 
It might be expected that people will choose a strong 
password for a sensitive application. Evidence for this is 
mixed; Zviran & Haga [23], in a large quantitative analysis 
of password choice, did not find any correlation between 
password length and composition and data sensitivity. 
However, we believe that there are issues around password 
choice which can only be uncovered by an in-depth study of 
password use in actual practice. 
Choosing a weak password might be entirely rational, from 
a user’s point of view; the direct costs of attacks might be 
small and uncertain, but the indirect costs of additional 
effort are immediate and certain. Herley [12] provides 
important new insights into people’s implicit cost/benefit 
calculations in deciding whether or not to follow security 
rule. As he argues, e-commerce users understand the risks, 
and they judge the likely personal cost from password 
cracking or theft to be low. 
However, in this paper we are specifically concerned with 
password use in organisations. The costs of a password 
breach might include significant losses for the organisation, 
and serious consequences for the individual’s continued 
employment.. Adams & Sasse [1] argue that most users 
within organisations are security-conscious; insecure 
practices are not the result of a relaxed attitude, but are the 
result of ad-hoc attempts to deal with an unmanageable load 
and conflicting demands. 
The Problem for Policy-Setters and Policy-Users 
It is clear that, to be effective, security policies need to be 
written to balance the organisation’s security requirements 
against the ability of users to perform security tasks [14]. 
To achieve this balance, those responsible for setting 
policies need to understand the users’ primary task and 
context of operation, as well as the risks. As the same time, 
it may not always be possible to produce an ideal solution; 
there will always be some conflict between security and the 
smooth working of users’ primary tasks. 
METHODOLOGY 
Aims of the Study 
We want to understand users’ experiences of password use 
in organisational settings. It cannot be assumed that 
organisational use has the same costs and benefits, for users 
or for the organisation, as in studies of individual 
performance with passwords or use of passwords by 
consumers. From the organisation’s viewpoint, passwords 
are subject to password rules and policies which are under 
their control, as decided by policy setters - Chief 
Information Security Officers or other senior managers. 
From a detailed study of daily password use, we aimed to 
understand more about specific problems faced by users in 
conforming to password policies, and the strategies which 
they adopt to cope with these issues. 
Overall Approach 
The research was conducted within the context of a large 
project to model different aspects of organisational security 
policies [21]. For that purpose, we sought quantitative data 
about how long passwords take to enter, how often different 
types of password are used, and an understanding of the 
context of use. 
Our research is also a rich source of qualitative data, 
particularly the transcripts of voice recordings of debrief 
sessions following each participant’s diary keeping. 
Our approach differs from previous research in two ways. 
First, by taking the password itself as the object of study, 
rather than the user and their experience with passwords in 
general, we were able to study the contextual factors that 
surround the password. Second, we wanted to study users’ 
daily experiences with those passwords. 
We asked our participants to record actual password events 
that occurred in their working day; we hoped that this 
would record problems and their immediate impact, and 
provide a cue for discussing practices and lived experiences 
resulting from particular password policies in subsequent 
semi-structured interviews. In retrospect, our approach was 
successful in identifying password practices, but less so in 
bringing to light specific events. Table 1: Participants in the diary & interview study 
Three Forms of “In the Wild” Data 
Capturing the situated actions of people interacting with 
technology requires detailed recording of events as they 
occur. However, video recording was not an option due to 
the sensitive nature of passwords, and our initial attempt at 
shadowing with pencil-and-paper recordings was cut short 
because Organisation B thought shadowing staff was 
commercially too sensitive. It was important for us to 
develop a methodology which interfered as little as possible 
with users’ flow of work. We thus adopted a combined 
approach, using diary studies to record users’ actual use of 
passwords, as accurately as possible within the limitations 
of self-reporting, followed by an interview. 
Diary Study 
Diary studies are an established method to investigate 
technology in use in HCI [5, 15]. It is important to be clear, 
however, that in contrast to those studies, in our case the 
diary was highly structured, apart from space for free-text 
responses where participants were asked to give the 
background task - such as starting work - and specific 
reason for password use - such as authenticating to a 
particular service. 
Debrief Interviews 
The debrief interviews were structured around a 
questionnaire to capture details of users’ passwords, but 
administered by the researchers and voice-recorded, with 
participants encouraged to discuss the reasons for their 
questionnaire responses in depth. In this way, our method is 
between ethnography and quantitative methods. Our diary 
study provides data which are amenable to quantitative 
analysis, for example around the frequencies of various 
kinds of password events. 
Organisation A 
Length  7 or 8 characters 
Character sets  At least one character from 
3 of 4 classes 
Character classes are upper case letters, lower case letters, 
digits, and non-alphanumeric characters 
Passwords must not consist of words or proper names, 
including known foreign-language words, or variants 
produced by exchanging I’s, L’s and O’s for 1’s and 0’s 
Expiry 4  months 
History  Must not be similar to 
previous 12 passwords 
Password management  Password synchronisation 
- one password for many 
organisational systems 
Impending password expiry is signalled to users by an 
email sent to their organisational address 
Organisation B 
Length  Minimum 6 characters 
Character sets  Identical to Organisation A 
Passwords must not include parts of the user’s name or 
other common words 
Expiry 90  days 
History  Must not be identical to 
previous 9 passwords 
Password management  SSO for most 
organisational systems 
Impending password change is signalled to users by a 
warning at log-on time for two weeks prior to expiry 
Table 2: Password policies in the two organisations 
Sampling 
Because we were concerned with organisational password 
policies, we recruited participants from among staff 
members within two organisations. Over a period from 
December, 2008 to August, 2009, we recruited 32 
participants who each kept the diary for 4-5 working days - 
see Table 1. Participants were all volunteers and were 
compensated with gift certificates. We recorded 17.4 hours 
of interviews from these participants. Although this is a 
relatively small sample size, it is appropriate for an in-depth 
analysis of diaries and qualitative data. 
Analysis 
The forms collected during the structured interviews were 
digitised into a relational database; this relatively formal 
data structure allowed for rapid extraction of data. 
Organisation A 
A large research-intensive university; participants are 
administrators, and lecturers or researchers in disciplines 
removed from Computer Science and HCI, and teaching 
staff: 
Administrative staff  7 
Lecturing and research (non-Computer 
Science/HCI) 
8 
Organisation B 
A large financial services organisation. Participants are 
members of a security team and Human Resources 
administrators. The security team members are of interest to 
us as a sample of more security-aware users 
HR Administration   5 
Security team  12 Data quality 
Where a participant kept a diary for more than 5 days, only 
the first 5 days were included in the quantitative analyses, 
although all days were nevertheless recorded for the 
information they provide for qualitative analysis. 4 
participants kept a diary for only 4 days each. All 4 were 
part-time workers, and the 4 days comprised their work 
days over the study period; we have included their entries. 
For 2 participants, we felt that the diary data was unreliable 
and have discarded it from the quantitative results, but 
nevertheless used the debrief in the qualitative analysis. 
This left 982 password events suitable for analysis. 
As well as the paper record of password details taken 
during the interviews, we had the transcripts and recordings 
of the interviews, and so were able to double-check the 
questionnaire data. We identified 26 passwords from 14 
participants which were recorded in the diaries but for 
which details were not reported in the debriefs, due to error 
or for reasons such as an extension of the diary after the 
debrief. We also noted 3 passwords recorded in the debriefs 
but not recorded in the questionnaire results. These were 
excluded from the quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
We collected 196 separate passwords in total in the diaries. 
However, some passwords are fixed by the architecture to 
be identical to others, as a single password for use across 
many systems. Some participants recorded these as separate 
passwords while others chose to record them as one. This 
applies to 52 passwords, leaving 144 unique passwords. 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis 
We analysed the data quantitatively and qualitatively in 
terms of different uses for each password, to understand 
specific triggers for password use. The basic method was to 
identify common issues and correlations quantitatively, and 
to add depth by focussed qualitative analysis. Our 
questionnaire and diaries used 5-point Likert-style scales, in 
some cases labelled. 
The transcribed recordings were analysed using a variant of 
Grounded Theory [6]. We used Atlas TI [19] to aid our 
qualitative analysis. Unlike classic Grounded Theory, we 
did not develop a single “core” code, but instead we 
identified common themes around each of the following 
clusters of codes: 
1.  Sensitivity of passwords, and factors which affect it; 
2.  Estimated strength of passwords and why participants 
consider passwords to be strong or weak; 
3.  Coping with the demands of password policies, both 
for devising passwords and for remembering them; 
4.  Similarity of passwords with other passwords used by 
participants; 
5.  The “ecology”, or context, surrounding each password. 
Each of these clusters of codes was then used to build a 
“meta-code” and re-coded for common factors between 
participants. 
RESULTS 
Our analyses of daily practices around passwords, and their 
impact on users, produced findings that we can categorise 
under three headings: 
i.  Conflict between password policies and the 
capabilities of users, and the problems this creates; 
ii.  The ways users find to cope with this conflict; and 
iii.  The impact on security of different contexts of use. 
Conflict Between Password Policies and Users’ Needs 
We examined users’ perceived needs for compliance with 
secure practices, and found that users are cogent in their 
understanding of security needs, but nevertheless find the 
demands imposed by password policies too difficult. 
We begin by showing some of the features of password 
policies that create burdens for users. Later, we consider the 
strategies which users adopt to attempt to cope with these 
demands; however, each coping strategy introduces its own 
problems, as we shall see. 
Our findings support those of Adams & Sasse [1] that the 
majority of users are security-conscious, and can 
understand the need for secure behaviour. On the other 
hand, forcing them into behaviours which they perceive as 
too stringent creates a conflict between their perception and 
the enforced practice. 
The Burden of Changing Passwords 
Regular password changing is recommended by NIST [14] 
and mandated in both organisations, with the intention of 
mitigating the risk from compromised passwords: the risk 
of a password being compromised increases with its 
lifetime. 
Users rarely change their password unless forced to do so. 
We asked participants how often they change their 
passwords. Apart from those passwords (network and 
others - 40 in total) for which change is enforced, only 10 
of the 144 unique passwords are changed more than once 
per year, and even of those, 5 are only changed because the 
participants forget them. 
In minimising password change, participants are being 
completely reasonable: changing passwords places a heavy 
burden on users, both in devising a new password and also 
in learning them. 
The Burden of Devising Passwords 
Generating new passwords which must conform to a strict 
security policy is a non-trivial interruption to users’ 
activities. Password policies are highly restrictive - but users are 
unclear about what the rules are. In Organisation A, users 
changing a password were surprised that to find the system 
would not allow anything it deemed similar to the users’ 12 
previous passwords. This meant they were unable to apply 
their usual method for constructing passwords: 
so it's got to the point where it's ... so difficult to make 
one up, and difficult to remember, that I have to write it 
down. 
The need to invent new passwords which are not obviously 
similar to previous ones challenges the mental resources of 
users: 
this one we do have to keep changing all the time, and it 
gets harder to, to think of things 
The Burden of Learning Passwords 
Passwords which are used very frequently are remembered 
easily; 59 unique passwords were said to be remembered 
“automatically” in this way. This is so, even for the 
complex passwords in Organisation A: 
no I don't forget my... I never, I don't think I've ever 
forgotten my [Organisation] one, not because I've got 
such a wonderful memory but just because you type it so 
often. 
Thus, requiring strong passwords might be acceptable, if 
users were able to keep to one password which is used 
frequently for almost all uses within the organisation. 
Unfortunately, this does not overcome the problem of 
remembering it in the first few days; this learning period 
can be especially challenging for part-time staff: one 
reported using a clue as a reminder on Monday mornings 
following a change. 
Moreover, it is not always the case that the organisational 
password is used frequently, while others are used less 
often: in Organisation A, some departments have a local 
password, which means that the main organisational 
password is used only occasionally - this was the case for 
two of our participants. 
The Burden of Forgetting 
Forgetting a password is always an interruption; but, in 
some cases, “remembering by reset” might be a reasonable 
strategy in situations such as returning from vacation or for 
infrequently-used passwords. 
Unfortunately, in the case of Organisation A, arranging a 
password reset is more complicated. A participant described 
a typical scenario: 
first I go through a series of passwords that I use, and 
hope it's one of them, and when it locks me out, I swear 
at [Information Systems], and it has to be reset 
completely 
which entails a call or visit to the helpdesk
1; but once the 
password is reset, it takes up to two hours before it has 
propagated to all the systems. 
The effort and, more importantly, the time delay involved 
in resetting passwords raises a genuine fear of forgetting; 
considering the disruptions it causes to users’ tasks and 
productivity; another participant reported: 
I get emails, think I'm too busy to open that, and then I 
did it yesterday and I was down to you've got 10 more 
days ... I've just been too busy to risk forgetting the 
password or having two hours where I can't log in ... 
that’s happened to me before. 
Coping with Password Policies 
Users develop strategies to cope with matching password 
needs to security requirements. when the requirements of 
the policy exceed users’ capabilities, they are forced to 
develop more complex - or, alternatively, less secure - 
coping techniques. 
Coping with Choosing Passwords 
Most users we observed had developed (sometimes quite 
imaginative) strategies for generating passwords – such as 
using paired words from a cycle of non-English words. Of 
course, if a strong password is mandatory, then users are 
forced to be imaginative. 
Paradoxically, upper limits on password length or character 
set - which reduce the possible password strength -, as well 
as fixed passwords, also block users from using their 
preferred scheme. This is notably the case for the main 
password in Organisation A, which must be 7 or 8 
characters; bank passwords and some e-commerce (such as 
train company) passwords also restrict the character set.  
The most obvious scheme to generate passwords is to re-
cycle an old one, perhaps making some small change. Users 
see “good” passwords (that are memorable and conform to 
the policy) as a “resource”, which they continue to use for 
new applications even if the original use is no longer 
allowed. Of the 144 unique passwords, we found 14 
currently also used for other work-related passwords, 17 re-
used for personal uses, and 22 not identical but similar to 
other passwords - a total of 53. This is in addition to the 52 
passwords which are forced to be identical by the 
architecture of the system. 
Re-use does not necessarily mean people are using the same 
or similar passwords for “everything”; only two of our 
participants admitted to doing so, even though in 
Organisation B that would be quite possible. 
                                                           
1 A self-reset is now available, but was not, at the time of 
this research Writing Passwords Down 
An obvious - and potentially risky - response to the demand 
to learn a new password is to write the password down. 
Of the 15 participants in Organisation A, 9 admitted to 
writing down the main organisational password, either for 
the first few days of use or if, because of the nature of their 
work, they only use the organisational password 
occasionally. 
It could be considered small progress since the findings of 
Adams & Sasse [1] that most users who write down 
passwords now do so apologetically, and keep it in some 
“safe” place, such as a diary. Even though this is some 
progress, passwords in a “safe” place at home or work are 
still at risk from attackers [12, 18], and, since wallets and 
diaries can be lost, the coping strategy is not always 
effective. 
For comparison, none of the participants from Organisation 
B wrote down their network or PC login password, and the 
reason seems clear - although forced to change their 
passwords as in Organisation A, small, easily remembered 
changes are allowed. Unfortunately, this can lead to new 
problems - the user remembers the basic password, but may 
fail to remember the variations. 
Users Want To Be Secure, But Do Not Always Know How 
We have said that few participants showed a relaxed 
attitude, eg., using the same password for everything. At the 
same time, users need to balance what they perceive to be 
reasonably strong passwords against the need to remember 
them, especially if they are not frequently used. 
Yet choosing a reasonably strong, yet memorable, password 
is not easy. At least 3 participants - out of 5 non-security 
specialist participants in Organisation B - described their 
SSO password in terms which show that they are very weak 
- for example “an item that is on my desk ... and then add a 
number to it” - even for what they admit are sensitive 
applications. These participants nevertheless described the 
passwords as secure or fairly secure. Whereas Organisation 
A frustrates users by enforcing an overly-strong policy, 
Organisation B appears to offer little guidance to non-
specialist users about appropriate password choice. 
Such passwords are clearly guessable, but even apparently 
strong passwords might be guessable by someone with 
personal knowledge of the user - names or initials of 
relatives and significant dates are a popular scheme. Such 
passwords pass the stringent checking used in Organisation 
A; this reliance on a technical approach of enforcement, 
then, not only does not help users to learn how to make 
better passwords, but also does not always detect poor ones. 
The Importance of the Context of Password Use 
A core HCI principle is that, to be accepted by users, 
security policies must fit with an individual or 
organisation’s primary task [1, 4]. However, it has been less 
noted that the organisational context also covers aspects of 
the security architecture which have the potential to make 
life easier or more demanding for users. 
Context impacts the frequency and ease of password use - 
and, consequently, on the ability of users to become 
familiar with complex passwords - as well as on the 
sensitivity of passwords and risks from security breaches. 
We typically think of passwords as authentication for a PC 
or online service. However, in daily use passwords 
encompass many other reasons for use, and the same 
password is often used for many services, by user choice or 
by the architecture of the authentication system. 
For our questionnaire, we started with an a priori set 
categories of password use, but from our analysis we 
expanded this to at least 14, including some which are not 
often considered when password policies are designed. 
Space prevents us discussing each category in detail here, 
but notable categories are well-known uses such as access 
to company or third-party service and login to a local PC; 
emerging uses such as Single Sign-On and login to an 
online virtual desktop; and less-considered uses such as 
work-related social networking, access to personal HR 
information, and password-protecting shared files and other 
resources. 
Frequency of Use: Single sign-on vs. Single Password 
The context of use is exemplified by the differences 
between use of Single Sign-On and single passwords. Both 
organisations have password architectures which require the 
use of the same password for multiple services. However, 
in Organisation A, this is a unified organisational password, 
not true Single Sign-On (SSO): users are required to re-
enter the password for each service - and also following 
timeouts of each service, a major source of frustration for 
those who have to work on a number of different online 
services. 
Organisation B, in contrast, has true SSO in most instances. 
This might be expected to reduce password use. On the 
other hand, company policy is that staff should lock their 
PCs when leaving their desks, which generates an 
additional set of usages - 317 in the diaries, by far the 
largest number of usages, in fact, although each one 
requires only a password, not the userId - participants report 
that this is not a large interruption: they are not actually 
interrupted by the password entry, but are returning from 
getting a drink or some similar break. 
Sensitivity Varies with the Context of Use 
Sensitivity - in the sense of “what bad things could happen 
from unauthorised access” - depends on what an attacker 
could actually do with a password; and that, in turn, 
depends on the level of access which the password gives. In 
Organisation A, access control is implemented in particular 
services; for example, in a student records system, only authorised staff are able to enter student marks, although all 
staff access the same system. 
If a password is used to logon locally to a PC, then whether 
this is sensitive or not depends, naturally, on the data stored 
on the computer and that, in turn, on whether the PC stores 
data locally or is essentially a front-end to a virtual online 
desktop - an increasingly common architecture which is 
widely used in both organisations. Access to network 
filestore can be controlled - in Organisation B, a dedicated 
team ensures correct authorisation to shared and personal 
filestore. The actual data which might be visible is therefore 
controlled, and also depends on the area of work - and can 
change, as people move onto different projects. On the 
other hand, some staff have access to drives which are 
shared among other members of their department - and 
which therefore contain data which may need further 
protection, by passwords or other access control. 
Use of Passwords for File Sharing 
There is one type of password which emerged from our 
findings that exemplifies unsophisticated security practices 
which create serious risks: passwords used for protecting 
shared files and shared web spaces. Although file 
passwords account for a relatively small number of events 
in our password diaries, such passwords are used 
extensively among numbers of people. Our research found 
situations in which shared passwords have become the de 
facto method of controlling access to shared resources.  
There are two categories of shared password – long-term 
and ad-hoc ones. Long-term passwords are shared among 
many recipients, and used many times - participants in both 
organisations reported this practice, even for access to 
sensitive information. Where files are genuinely shared 
among users, this might be an appropriate practice [1]; 
however, at least some of the passwords we found shared in 
this way are extremely weak, and unchanged for years: the 
difficulty of distributing the new password to a number of 
users discourages changing. 
With ad-hoc shared passwords, participants devise one-use 
file passwords which consist mainly of single words chosen 
at random (for example, the name on a passing truck, or an 
item on the sender’s desk); the password is emailed to the 
intended recipient. We found that shared passwords did not 
conform to the organisational password policies. Adding 
the password is often the last obstacle to completing a time-
critical task (such as sending a monthly report or update), 
and so users are keen to “just get it done”. 
DISCUSSION 
The conflicts and the issues we have uncovered with 
passwords in actual use, can be traced fundamentally to ill-
considered password policies, in terms of 1) factors which 
are covered in the policies: insisting on passwords which 
are unfeasibly strong, or changed too frequently; and 2) 
factors which are not considered in the policies: the 
different uses of passwords, and other contextual issues 
A large-scale web study found that users choose weak - 
mainly lowercase-only - passwords whenever they can [10]. 
[11] argues that this failure to use strong passwords is a 
rational choice, if the direct losses associated with a breach 
are small compared with the user costs of choosing a strong 
password. 
However, unlike many consumer transactions on the web, 
breaches such as the loss of student records or details of 
staff benefits could have incalculable costs. Weak 
passwords are not a rational choice in those cases. Our 
users understood this; if they continue to choose weak 
passwords, it is not because they are irrational or lax, but 
because devising and remembering a strong password is a 
considerable effort and an interruption to their primary task. 
In our study, both organisations prevent users from 
choosing such weak passwords - at least for their main 
password. However, this additional password strength 
comes at a cost, not only for the users but also for the 
organisation, in terms of time lost and, paradoxically, a 
potential loss of security. 
The True Cost of Unusable Password Policies 
We have shown that factors in password policy lead to 
frustration when users are unable to comply with password 
policies; such policies clearly do not meet their needs, and 
they are forced to adopt coping strategies. 
We focus on Organisation A because it provides such a 
clear example of impact of an excessively strict password 
policy on the experience of users. Because the policy is 
very restrictive in the passwords it allows, users are unable 
to use their normal password methods for choosing 
passwords. However, if - as is likely - their normal methods 
for choosing passwords are weak, then this is not, in itself, 
necessarily undesirable. Unfortunately, in the case of 
Organisation A, the checking is excessive; this does not 
guarantee that the password cannot be cracked (that would 
be impossible), but it does guarantee that users are 
frustrated in quite reasonable password choices. 
But once they have chosen a password which is strong 
enough, and have learnt it, users still do not have a 
password “resource” they can continue to use. This is 
because, when change is enforced, unlike in Organisation 
B, small changes to passwords are not accepted. Unless 
users can discover some unintended loophole to thwart the 
checking, the entire process of choosing has to start again. 
Users then have a double load: both to choose a new 
password which is acceptable to the policy, and to learn it. 
Thus, the unusability of the policy arises from the 
combination of the requirement for the password to be 
excessively strong and for it to be changed frequently and 
for the new password to differ significantly from previous 
passwords. In comparison, Organisation B does require frequent change, but is much more lenient in the 
requirements for password strength and, crucially, allows 
for new passwords to be minimally different from previous 
ones. 
Adding to the emotional pressure on users, and impeding 
their primary goals, is their awareness that, should they 
forget their password, this will require a reset, with a delay 
of two hours during which their access to essential 
organisational services will be lost; in many cases they are 
unable to work during this time. 
Faced with this conflict, it is not surprising that a majority 
of participants from Organisation A admit to writing these 
passwords down, not in disregard of security policies, but 
as the only workable coping strategy. Indeed, writing 
passwords down is half-accepted by the Organisation A 
policy, which merely says “don't keep a record of your 
userid and password together”. This is not a solution; our 
point is that writing down is a response to an unusable 
policy. 
Strength and Change Frequency is the Wrong Focus 
We have seen that Organisation A enforces passwords 
which are strong to the point that users are frustrated in 
their reasonable password choices. 
However, the password strength may not be the most 
important factor in preventing unauthorised access. For 
many personal mobile devices, the number of password 
attempts is limited, so that online cracking is unfeasible. 
For almost all online applications, the number of attempts is 
also limited. There remains, however, the risk of offline 
attacks, for example if the password file, even with hashed 
or encrypted passwords, has been captured. 
But password strength does nothing to prevent phishing or 
key-logging [11]. The other key aspect of Organisation A’s 
policy - password change - is designed to mitigate these 
risks, along with the risk of “brute force” attacks. Whether a 
single-character change, as allowed by Organisation B, 
would be sufficient to deter a serious attacker is uncertain. 
Clearly, if a computer is compromised by a key-logger, 
merely changing the password will not fix the problem. 
What  is certain is that requiring users to make major 
changes to their existing passwords creates conflict for the 
user, between their primary goals and the requirements of 
the policy. 
Nor, as we have seen, does the Organisation A policy 
provide much protection from passwords being guessed by 
those with special knowledge of the user. And, crucially, 
the Organisation A policy greatly increases the threat from 
passwords left written down. 
Returning finally to the costs and benefits to the user and to 
the organisation, it might seem that an employing 
organisation gains all the benefits from strong password 
policies, while the staff members, as users, carry all the 
costs. It should be clear from what we have said, however, 
that this is spurious: even if staff are willing, or able, to 
work the extra hours to overcome time lost through 
password problems, this is at the expense of goodwill and 
effectiveness. 
CONCLUSIONS AND A WAY FORWARD 
We have looked in detail at a snapshot of events for a 
sample of password users; but every minute taken in 
unnecessary password use needs to be multiplied by orders 
of magnitude to account for all the password uses even 
within one organisation. This is the true cost of unusable 
password policies. Against the world-view that “if only 
[users] understood the dangers, they would behave 
differently” [12], we argue that “if only security managers 
understood the true costs for users and the organisation, 
they would set policies differently”. We conclude with 
some suggestions for how this might be achieved. 
Towards Holistic Password Policies 
The vision of a holistic approach for security policies is not 
new; Sasse et al. [16] outlined what such a policy should 
contain. In moving to a holistic approach, there is no single 
ideal policy, as the ongoing debate about writing passwords 
down [12, 17] indicate. 
Focussing on frequency of password changing, or password 
strength, without considering the user in their context of 
work, is clearly not holistic. Technical means can force 
people to change their passwords frequently; if this leads to 
weaker passwords, technical means can enforce strong 
passwords. If users then forget those passwords, technical 
services can be provided to assist password resets - and the 
cycle starts again. It becomes, as Herley [12] puts it, “an 
existing system [that] can only be kept going with constant 
patching”. This does nothing to encourage security 
awareness, but introduces usability problems which 
antagonise users. 
Beautement et al. [3] propose the model of the Compliance 
Budget to understand how users balance the effort of 
complying with a security behaviour required by an 
organisation, against their own benefits in the context of 
their production goals. This offers a positive way forward, 
since the organisation can manage users’ compliance 
budget through good security design and a security-aware 
organisational culture. 
In the age of cloud computing, it becomes technically 
feasible to brute-force passwords, but the cost is a 
constraining factor. Simple lower-case passwords must be 
at least 12 letters long to keep within a cost of $US1million; 
if uppercase, numbers, and non-alphanumerics are added, 
10 characters is the minimum needed to do so [8]. If 
policies continue in their current spirit, we can expect these 
longer and/or more complex passwords to become 
mandatory for everything. Our findings show that users 
already struggle with the burden generated by current 
restrictions - which are significantly less - and so we could expect the behaviours we observed to be magnified, leading 
to overburden and collapse. This puts all the more urgency 
on reserving these strong password requirements for 
contexts in which brute-force cracking is a realistic risk. 
Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, we argue for a 
flexible password policy tailored to mitigate the risks users 
actually face. This flexibility needs to extend beyond 
technical issues, to allow for the differing security needs of 
different work groups. Alternatively, perhaps the cloud will 
provide the motivation to finally move to a different 
authentication mechanism. 
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